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This document contains supporting material for ‘Inefficiencies in Networked Markets.’
Many additional results are stated that are not included in the main paper. Proofs are
collated at the back. The following sections are included:
(1) Shapley and Shubik (1972)
(2) Network Decomposition Extended Example
(3) Payoff Equivalence with a Non-Cooperative Bargaining Game
(4) Network Decomposition with Deleted Links
(5) Existence of a stable network
(6) Stability of the Efficient Network
(7) Absolute Inefficiency Bound
(8) Vertical Differentiation
(9) Comparative Statics
OA-1. Shapley and Shubik (1972)
In this section we discuss the results from Shapley and Shubik (1972) that we use in
Section III of the paper.
Consider a stable bargaining outcome (µS,uS,vS). It is easy to see that i and µS(i) must
split the gains from trade they generate between them in a pairwise stable outcome. If
uSi + v
S
µS(i) < αiµS(i), buyer i and seller j would have a profitable pairwise deviation, so
uSi + v
S
µS(i) ≥ αiµS(i). Summing over all buyers and sellers:
∑
i∈P u
S
i +
∑
j∈Q v
S
µS(i) ≥∑
i∈P αiµS(i). As the total surplus available to distribute is
∑
i∈P αiµS(i), it must be that
uSi + v
S
µS(i) = αiµS(i) for all buyers i ∈ P.
We now show that if there are no profitable pairwise deviations, there are also no prof-
itable coalitional deviations (the set of stable outcomes coincides with the set of core
outcomes). Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists a profitable coalitional
deviation among the agents P̂ ∪ Q̂ but no profitable pairwise deviation. Let S be the
maximum surplus such a coalition could generate by matching among themselves. Denote
this match µ′, so that for all i ∈ P̂, µ′(i) ∈ Q̂ and S = ∑i∈P̂ αiµ′(i). For the deviation to
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be profitable, initial payoffs must sum to less than this surplus:
∑
i∈P̂ u
S
i +
∑
j∈Q̂ v
S
j < S.
However, uSi + v
S
µ′(i) ≥ αiµ′(i) for all i ∈ P̂, as there is no profitable pairwise deviation.
Summing over all i ∈ P̂, we get that ∑i∈P̂ uSi +∑j∈Q̂ vSj ≥ S. This is a contradiction,
hence the pairwise stable outcomes coincide with the core outcomes.
An immediate observation is that the grand coalition would have a profitable deviation
for any µS 6= µ∗, and so µ∗ must be the unique pairwise stable match. For any match
other than µ∗, the match µ∗ could be implemented, and the additional surplus used to
give everyone a payoff strictly above their current payoff.
Finally, we show that the set of stable payoffs forms a complete lattice for the partial
ordering of buyers’ payoffs, where u > u′ if and only if ui > u′i for all i ∈ P. Consider
two payoff vectors, u and u′. We need to show that the payoff vector û = u ∨ u′ such
that for all i, uˆi = max(ui, u
′
i) is also stable, and the payoff vector u˜ = u ∧ u′ such that,
u˜i = min(ui, u
′
i) is stable. We focus here on showing that û is stable; the argument for u˜
is symmetric. Consider any buyer–seller pair i, j who are not matched. As the match is
pairwise stable, for both payoffs u and u′, we have
ui + vj ≥ αij
u′i + v
′
j ≥ αij
In addition, we know that uµ(j)∗ + vj = u
′
µ(j)∗ + v
′
j = αµ(j)∗j. Consider now the buyer
payoffs u ∨ u′. At these payoffs, we have
max{ui, u′i}+ min{vj, v′j} ≥ maxui, u′i + min{αij − ui, αij − u′i} = αij,
so i and j still do not have a profitable pairwise deviation.
OA-2. Network Decomposition Extended Example
This section considers a more involved example to help illustrate how the tools developed
in Section III of the main document can be applied.
From Figure OA-1 it is not immediately clear what s4’s outside option will be, or what
role the different links in the network play in establishing s4’s outside option. However,
the multi-unit auction algorithm from De´mange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) can be
used to find s4’s outside option (their minimum core payoff). The multi-unit auction
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Figure OA-1. A more complicated network
algorithm works approximately as follows: Set the prices charged by all sellers to 0 and
consider which buyers want to trade with which sellers. Increase the price charged by each
overdemanded seller by one unit. Repeat this process until no seller is overdemanded.
In the above example, the prices charged by the sellers and the set of overdemanded
sellers would evolve as shown in Table OA-2. The prices are shown for each round and
the superscripts identify which buyers demand trade with which sellers at these prices.
In the final price vector, no seller is overdemanded as all buyers can be matched to one
of their most preferred sellers. The buyer matched to each seller in this final round is
highlighted, as are the prices traded at, which correspond to sellers’ outside options.
Round
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
s1 0
b1 0b1 0b1 0b1 0b1,b2 1b1,b2 2b1,b2 3b1,b2 4b1,b2
s2 0
b2,b3 1b2,b3 2b2,b3 3b2,b3 4b2,b3 5b2,b3 6b2,b3 7b2,b3 8b2,b3
s3 0
∅ 0∅ 0∅ 0∅ 0∅ 0∅ 0∅ 0∅ 0b3
s4 0
b4 0b4 0b4 0b4 0b4 0b4 0b4,b2 1b4,b2 2b4,b2
The assignment auction algorithm identifies sellers’ outside options. However, it is not
clear which links affect which sellers’ outside options and how. The network decompo-
sition algorithm provides this information. First, links used for trade and those used to
establish outside options are identified. This is shown in Figure OA-2a. Solid directed
links indicate trade relationships, and dashed directed links indicate which agents use
which links to establish outside options.
From the directed network decomposition, it is straightforward to find agents’ outside
option chains. Figure OA-2b highlights s4’s outside option chain. From Theorem 1,
outside options can be found by alternatively adding and then subtracting the values
of the links in an agent’s outside option chain: Seller s4’s outside option is a24 − a22 +
a32 − a33 = 4 − 10 + 18 − 10 = 2. This is the same outside option found by the
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Figure OA-2. Applying the directed network decomposition algorithm
assignment auction algorithm. The value of Theorem 1 is in showing how the links
identified by the network decomposition determine each agent’s payoff. Furthermore, the
assignment auction algorithm provides an alternative methodology through which the
network decomposition is possible. Each seller’s outside trade partner is the buyer who
is willing to trade with him, but does not, when the algorithm ends.
OA-3. Payoff Equivalence with a Non-Cooperative Bargaining Game
This section demonstrates an equivalence between the payoffs and matches generated by
the non-cooperative approach of Corominas-Bosch (2004) and the payoffs and matches
identified in Section III of the main document. Corominas-Bosch considers (bipartite)
networks of buyers and sellers where, as here, a link between a buyer and seller permits
trade but, unlike here, the value of trade is constant across buyer–seller pairs. To show
this equivalence, this section will consider only this more restricted environment:1
Assumption: The value of trade between every buyer–seller pair is either 1 or 0.
1 It is not straightforward to extend the Corominas-Bosch environment to include heterogeneous gains
from trade.
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The bargaining game modeled by Corominas-Bosch proceeds as follows: First, each agent
on one side of the market simultaneously makes a uniform offer to all agents on the other
side of the market he is connected to. Agents receiving offers then decide which, if any,
offer to accept. If an agent accepts an offer, trade occurs at the proposed terms of trade
and that buyer–seller pair exits the market. Each remaining agent who was initially on
the receiving side of the market then simultaneously makes a uniform offer to all agents
on the other side of the market he is connected to, and so on.
Corominas-Bosch defines three types of networks, as follows:2
• LS if n (the number of sellers) > m (the number of buyers) and any set of sellers
of size smaller than or equal to m can be simultaneously matched to different
buyers.
• LB if m > n and any set of buyers of size smaller than or equal to n can be
simultaneously matched to different sellers.
• LE if n = m and all sellers (equivalently all buyers) in L can be simultaneously
matched.
Then the following is shown:
Lemma. (Corominas-Bosch, Proposition 4) There exists a perfect equilibrium payoff in
the Corominas-Bosch bargaining game in which the following hold:
(i) Sellers in an LB network get 1, and buyers get 0.
(ii) Sellers in an LS network get 0, and buyers get 1.
(iii) Sellers in an LE network get (1− βC-B), and buyers get βC-B.
βC-B can be thought of as the relative bargaining power of buyers and sellers, and is
function of the discount factor δ reflecting first mover advantage as in the standard
Rubinstein–Stahl alternating-offers bargaining game (i.e., βC-B = 1/(1 + δ) if buyers
make the first offer).
Furthermore, Corominas-Bosch shows that any network can be decomposed into subnet-
works of the types LS, LB, and LE, with the bargaining solution in these subnetworks the
same as the bargaining solution for the entire network. This is achieved by the deletion
of links that do not affect the bargaining outcomes.
2 The marriage theorem is used to simplify these conditions. Consider, for example, a LS network. To
check that a network is a LS-type network directly from the definition, it would be necessary to check
that within every subset of sellers with up to m members, each individual seller can be matched with a
different buyer. The marriage theorem shows that, instead, it can simply be checked that every subset
with up to m members can be jointly matched to at least as many buyers.
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Equivalence between the Corominas-Bosch outcomes and the outcomes from Theorem 1
can now be stated:
Proposition OA-1. For any network L, where the gains from trade between any con-
nected buyer and seller over the network is 1, there is a perfect equilibrium payoff of the
Corominas-Bosch bargaining game that implements the same matches and coincides with
the payoffs from Theorem 1 for βC-B = β.
Proposition OA-1 is proved in Appendix A. There are two steps to the proof. First, it is
shown that in an LS, LB, or LE network the payoffs of players from the Corominas-Bosch
bargaining game coincide with payoffs identified in Section III of the main document
for βC-B = β. The second step of the proof shows that the same decomposition of
networks as imposed by Corominas-Bosch is possible without affecting payoffs. Indeed
the Corominas-Bosch decomposition deletes only the links that are also deleted by the
network decomposition algorithm.
Proposition OA-1 provides a non-cooperative justification for the bargaining solution
proposed in Section III of the main document. It also provides some justification for
Corominas-Bosch focusing on the perfect equilibrium payoffs she focuses on.
Unfortunately, the Corominas-Bosch approach cannot easily be extended to environments
with heterogeneous gains from trade. In some cases a heterogeneous gains from trade
network can be split into a number of homogeneous gains from trade networks, where the
payoffs in these networks are generated and then summed to generate the payoffs in the
heterogeneous network. However, this additivity does not often hold, and analysis of the
whole network at once must be undertaken. This prevents the repeated application of
the tools developed by Corominas-Bosch and provides a role for the alternative method-
ology employed in this paper. This emphasizes that the heterogeneous gains from trade
environment is richer than, and fundamentally different from, the homogeneous gains
from trade environment.3
3 With homogeneous gains from trade, outside option links can never benefit both agents they connect.
This will be particularly important when considering network formation, because if both agents have to
contribute towards the costs of forming a link, then no outside option links will ever be formed in the
homogeneous gains from trade case.
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OA-4. Network Decomposition with Deleted Links
This section shows that outside trade partners cannot always be identified in the network
decomposition algorithm by removing the link an agent trades over and considering whom
he rematches to, instead of removing his trade partner.
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Figure OA-3. Matches are identified in the above networks by the dashed
ovals.
Consider b1’s outside option. First, apply the standard network decomposition algorithm
to network L in Figure OA-3a. When s1 is removed from the network, b1 does not
rematch and has no outside trade partner. This suggests that b1’s outside option is 0.
Suppose now that the network decomposition algorithm were run by removing the link b1
trades over, l1,1, instead of s1. In this reduced network, which is shown in Figure OA-3c,
seller s2 would appear to be b1’s outside trade partner. Consider again the network L,
and suppose that b1 received a payoff of 0, s1 a payoff of 4, b2 a payoff of 1, and s2 a
payoff of 3. Despite b1 receiving a payoff of 0, this outcome is pairwise stable and b1 has
no profitable pairwise deviation. Also, b1 has no outside option. Thus the rematching of
b1 when the link to his trade partner was removed was misleading.
OA-5. Existence of a stable network
Suppose first that link-formation costs (investments) are split in exogenously determined
proportions.
Proposition OA-2. For all potential gains from trade a, all levels of bargaining power
β and all cost shares γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a stable network.
The proof of Proposition OA-2 is in Section A.2. It is constructive and generates the
following implication:
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Corollary OA-1. For all potential gains from trade (a), all levels of bargaining power
(β) and all cost shares (γ ∈ (0, 1)), there exists a stable network with no coordination
inefficiency.
Corollary OA-1 provides some additional motivation for focusing on underinvestment and
overinvestment inefficiency.
Suppose now that investment shares are negotiated endogenously.
Proposition OA-3. When cost shares are negotiated there exist potential gains from
trade (a) and levels of bargaining power (β) such that there is no network that is pairwise
Nash stable with transfers.
OA-6. Stability of the Efficient Network
When cost shares are exogenous, underinvestment in trade links is never a problem if
β = γ. In this case, any unmatched buyer and seller who could increase the net gains
from trade by forming a link will both find it profitable to do so. Furthermore, when
β = γ ∈ {0, 1}, so that the same side of the market has all the bargaining power and pays
all the costs of forming links, the efficient network will be stable. This is because links are
unilaterally formed by the side of the market that already extracts the maximum possible
rents from their trade partner, hence the agent on that side of the market cannot benefit
further from an outside option link. There is thus no underinvestment or overinvestment
in any stable network when β = γ ∈ {0, 1} and the efficient network is stable. However,
if (β = 1 and γ < 1) or (β = 0 and γ > 0), the unique stable network will be the empty
network and all potential gains from trade will be lost to underinvestment inefficiency.
When investment cost shares are negotiated, the efficient network will be stable when
no two buyers’ most preferred seller is the same and no two sellers’ most preferred buyer
is the same. There is then no value to any outside option. No agent can threaten to
trade with someone other than his trade partner, because no one other than his trade
partner will be willing to trade with him. As negotiation prevents any underinvestment
the efficient network is then stable. Furthermore, as c → 0 the efficient network will
be stable if and only if preferences meet this anti-assortativity condition. However, this
condition is unlikely to be met in many applications. Indeed, it is never met when there
are different numbers of buyers and sellers with positive potential gains from trade. These
results are summarized in Proposition OA-4.
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Proposition OA-4. When cost shares are exogenous, the following hold:
(i) If γ ∈ [0, 1] = β, there will be no underinvestment in any stable network.
(ii) If γ = β = 1 or γ = β = 0, the efficient network will be stable and there will be
no underinvestment or overinvestment in any stable network.
(iii) If (β = 1 and γ < 1) or (β = 0 and γ > 0), all potential gains from trade will be
lost to underinvestment and the unique stable network will be the empty network.
When cost shares are endogenous, the following hold:
(i) The efficient network will be stable if the following anti-assortativity conditions
hold:
(a) argmaxj(aij) 6= argmaxj(ai′,j) for all i 6= i′; and
(b) argmaxi(aij) 6= argmaxi(aij′) for all j 6= j′.
(ii) If β ∈ (0, 1), then as c → 0 the efficient network will be stable if and only if the
above anti-assortativity conditions hold.
(iii) If the same network Le is efficient for all c ∈ [c, c], then there exists a threshold
c∗ ∈ < such that for all c ∈ [c, c] the efficient network is stable if and only if
c > c∗.
(iv) There exist potential gains from trade a and c′ < c′′ such that Le(c′) 6= Le(c′′),
Le(c′) is stable, and Le(c′′) is not stable, where Le(c) is the efficient network for
cost of link formation c.
OA-7. Absolute Inefficiency Bound
So far, efficiency losses have been considered relative to the potential net gains from
trade. It is also possible to bound the absolute size of efficiency losses when cost sharing
is endogenous:
Proposition OA-5. In any stable network L with K links formed and endogenous
cost sharing, the absolute magnitude of inefficiency is bounded such that NGT (Le) −
NGT (L) ≤ Kc.
Proposition OA-5 has a couple of interesting implications. First, as c→ 0 all stable net-
works generate net gains from trade approaching that generated by the efficient network
and there cannot be any coordination problems. Second, for c > 0, stable networks with
fewer links have a tighter inefficiency bound. It is the possibility of overinvestment rather
than coordination inefficiency that drives the inefficiency bound.
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OA-8. Vertical Differentiation
The results in this section are closely related to those in Felli and Roberts (2002). The
main difference is that here pairwise stability underlies the bargained outcomes, while
Felli and Roberts model Betrand competition.
It will be assumed that there are increasing differences in the gains from trade: Buyers
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m + 1} and sellers j ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1} can be indexed so that if i′ < i′′ and
j′ < j′′, then ai′j′ − ai′j′′ > ai′′j′ − ai′′j′′ , where bm+1 = sn+1 = ∅ and aij = 0 if either
i = m+ 1 or j = n+ 1.
There are a number of immediate implications of the increasing differences condition.
First, sellers’ products are vertically differentiated, hence the quality of their products is
unambiguously ranked by all buyers in the same way, with seller s1 offering the highest
quality product: for all j′′ > j′ and all i′, ai′j′ > ai′j′′ . This follows from setting i′′ = m+1.
Second, buyers can be ranked in their preferences for quality, with buyer b1 having the
strongest preference for high quality. If a buyer prefers a higher-quality to a lower-quality
good by more than another buyer, then he prefers any higher-quality good to any lower-
quality good by more than the other buyer. Equivalently, because of the symmetry of
buyers and sellers, the quality of buyers can be unambiguously ranked by sellers, and
sellers’ preferences for quality can be ranked.
Proposition OA-6. When the increasing differences condition holds and the complete
network has been formed then for all k ≤ min(m,n):
(i) Buyer bk will be matched to seller sk.
(ii) Buyer bk’s trade partner will be sk+1.
(iii) Seller sk’s outside trade partner will be buyer bk+1.
(iv) ubk > ubk+1.
(v) vsk > vsk+1.
The results of Proposition OA-6 can be summarized in the directed network representa-
tion of the network, shown in Figure OA-4, where solid links identify trade partners and
dotted links identify outside trade partners.
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Figure OA-4. Outside option chains for vertically differentiated agents
With increasing differences in a, the efficient network links a buyer to a seller if and
only if that seller has the same quality ranking as the buyer and abksk ≥ c. Figure OA-4
shows that no buyer and seller use the same link to establish an outside option when the
complete network has been formed. Furthermore, it will be shown that no buyer and
seller can ever benefit from the same outside option link. This prevents the formation of
any outside option links when investment cost shares are separate and both agents must
make some positive investment.
Proposition OA-7. Let K ′ be defined by abK′sK′ ≥ c > abK′+1sK′+1. If there are increas-
ing differences in a, then for all β ∈ (0, 1) the following hold:
(i) When cost shares are exogenous and γ ∈ (0, 1), there will be no overinvestment
inefficiency in any stable network and the efficient network will be stable if and
only if min{β/γ, (1− β)/(1− γ)}abK′sK′ ≥ c.
(ii) When cost shares are endogenous the efficient network will be stable if and only
if max{(1− β)(a12 − a22), β(a21 − a22)} ≤ c.
Part (i) of Proposition OA-7 shows that when cost shares are exogenous and investment
by both the buyer and seller is required for a link to be formed, the efficient network
will be stable if and only if the lowest quality buyer–seller pair who form a link in the
efficient network are both willing to form the link. Part (ii) shows that when cost shares
are endogenous, the efficient network will be stable if and only if the highest quality
buyer does not want to form an outside option link to the second highest quality seller,
and the highest quality seller does not want to form an outside option link to the second
highest quality buyer. Proposition OA-7 reaffirms that overinvestment inefficiency is
most problematic when investments are negotiated, while underinvestment inefficiency is
more problematic when costs are exogenous.
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OA-9. Comparative Statics
This section first presents comparative statics results for bargaining over a formed net-
work and then develops comparative statics results for network formation.
Proposition OA-8. Adding a seller (and links connecting this seller to a formed net-
work) weakly increases the payoffs of all buyers and weakly decreases the payoffs of all
other sellers. Adding a buyer (and links connecting this buyer to a formed network)
weakly increases the payoffs of all sellers and weakly decreases the payoffs of all other
buyers.
While bargaining over a formed network generates positive results, it is much harder
to make any general comparative static claims about network formation. With endoge-
nous network formation, comparative static results are negative—the affect of parameter
changes are non-monotonic. Even when attention is restricted to cases where there is a
unique stable network, so that there is no question as to which stable network will be
formed, the effects of parameter changes are not predictable.
Increasing the cost of link formation (c) can either increases or reduce the resources wasted
on forming outside option links: An increase in c can result in fewer outside options being
formed or just increase the resources spent on forming the same links. Also, an increase
in c can either reduce or increase an agent’s payoff. When costs are shared endogenously,
or split such that both buyers and sellers have to make some contribution γ ∈ (0, 1),
this is not especially surprising: An increase in c can result in a trade partner no longer
forming an outside option link, thereby increasing an agent’s payoff. However, even when
only buyers contribute towards c (γ = 1), they can still benefit from an increase in c.
This is shown in the example below:
Suppose that the potential gains from trade a are as shown in Figure OA-5, and that
buyers pay for links to be formed (γ = 1) and β = 3
4
.
8 12
s1
8
s2
b2b1
Figure OA-5. A reduction in the cost of link formation can reduce ub2
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The complete network is stable only for c < 1. In the complete network, b1 forms a link
to s2 to establish an outside option and improve their terms of trade with s1. However,
this link also provides an outside option to s2. In the complete network, b2 receives a
payoff of 3− c. If the cost of link formation is now increased to a value above 1, so that
c ∈ (1, 3), then it is no longer worthwhile for b1 to form an outside option link to s2 and
the unique stable network is the efficient network. In this new network, b2 receives a
payoff of 6− c, which is greater than the payoff they received before the increase in c.
Increasing an agent’s bargaining power β can also reduce their payoff. This is shown in
the example below. Suppose that only sellers can form links (γ = 0), and that c = 2 and
the gains from trade matrix is as shown in Figure OA-6a.
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(c) Stable β < 12
Figure OA-6. Stable networks for different β
When β ∈ (1/2, 2/3), the complete network shown in Figure OA-6b is stable, because
s1 and s2 are willing to pay for the traded-over links and because seller s2’s payoff is
increased by 4β− c > 0 when they form the outside option link lb1s2 . Buyer b2’s payoff is
therefore 9β. Suppose now that β is decreased to a value below 1/2. With this lower β,
the complete network is no longer stable—seller s2 would delete their outside option link
to buyer b1, and the new stable network is shown in Figure OA-6c. Buyer b2’s payoff in
the new stable network is 13β. As a function of β, b2’s payoff is therefore discontinuous
at β = 1
2
. Their payoff jumps from ub2 = 6.5 when link lb1s2 is not formed to ub2 = 4.5
as link lb1s2 is formed. An increase in β about this point can therefore reduce buyer b2’s
payoff.
The above example shows that reduced bargaining power can increase an agent’s payoff
by reducing the incentives of their trade partner to form an outside option link. However,
even if a buyer’s trade partner cannot form links (γ = 1), this buyer can still benefit from
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a reduction in their bargaining power, which might induce another buyer in their outside
option chain to form an outside option link, thereby increasing their payoff.
The difficulty in generating positive comparative static results for investments emphasizes
the importance of case-by-case analysis for any intervention in the market. For example,
a government policy to reduce the costs of link formation could result in more resources
being wasted on link formation without affecting which buyers trade with which sellers.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition OA-1.
Proof. It is useful to first prove the following lemma:
Lemma OA-1. Section III of the main document shows how agents’ payoffs can be identified
from the network decomposition algorithm. These payoffs are such that for a formed network
the following hold:
(i) Sellers in an LB network get 1, and buyers get 0.
(ii) Sellers in an LS network get 0, and buyers get 1.
(iii) Sellers in an LE network get (1− β), and buyers get β, where β is buyers’ bargaining
power as defined in Section III of the main document.
Proof. Part (i): The payoffs identified in Section III of the main document are a convex
combination of the buyer-optimal and seller-optimal core payoffs. It is therefore sufficient
to show that both the buyer-optimal and seller-optimal points coincide with buyers always
getting 0 and sellers always getting 1. To find the seller-optimal point the multi-unit auction
algorithm considered by De´mange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) can be run with buyers and
sellers switched. This multi-unit auction algorithm is initialized with buyers’ shares of surplus
equal to 0, and then these shares are increased where there is excess demand for trade with a
buyer (as in Section OA-2). In an LB network, there are more buyers than sellers, and any
subset of the m buyers of size n is able to simultaneously match to all n sellers. As the surplus
from trade is always 1, sellers are indifferent about which buyer they trade with, and all n
sellers can be matched with different buyers, so that there will be no excess demand for trade
with any one buyer. Thus the algorithm terminates immediately, and sellers all receive a payoff
of 1, while buyers all receive a payoff of 0.
Consider now the buyer-optimal point in an LB network. This can be found by running the
same multi-unit auction algorithm, but with buyers bidding up sellers’ prices. Let the subset
of sellers ΨS ⊆ S be defined as
ΨS ≡ {j ∈ S : j ∈ argmin
j∈S
vj}
That is, ΨS is the set of sellers charging the lowest price.
By definition of LB, any subset of buyers less than or equal to the number of sellers can
be matched to different sellers over the network. It will be shown that a subset of sellers
(ΨS) of size |ΨS | must be jointly connected to at least m − n + |ΨS | buyers. Suppose that,
for some k ≥ 0, m − n + |ΨS | − k buyers were connected to a subset of sellers ΨS . The
complement of the subset of buyers connected to this subset of sellers must then be of size
m− (m−n+ |ΨS |−k) = n−|ΨS |+k. This is the number of buyers not connected to any seller
s ∈ ΨS . By definition of LB, these buyers must be able to connect to at least n − |ΨS | + k
different sellers. However, they can connect only to sellers not in ΨS , and so there are only
n− |ΨS | different sellers for them to connect to. Thus n− |ΨS |+ k ≤ n− |ΨS |, which implies
that k = 0.
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As there are more buyers than sellers (m > n) in an LB network, and the subset of sellers ΨS
of size |ΨS | must be connected to at least m−n+ |ΨS | buyers, the subset of sellers ΨS will be
connected to strictly more than |ΨS | buyers. Thus there will be excess demand by buyers for
trade with at least one s ∈ ΨS if the price charged by sellers in ΨS is less than 1. When the
multi-unit auction algorithm terminates, the lowest price charged by any seller must therefore
be greater than or equal to 1. By individual rationality, prices cannot increase to a value above
1, and so sellers all receive a payoff of 1, while buyers all receive a payoff of 0.
Part (ii): This proof is the same as Part (i) with the roles of buyers and sellers reversed.
Part (iii): In an LE network, a matching of all sellers to different buyers and all buyers to
different sellers is always possible. Thus both the buyer-optimal and seller-optimal versions
of the multi-unit auction algorithm terminate immediately. Under the buyer-optimal auction
algorithm, the buyers receive a payoff of 1, while sellers receive a payoff of 0; and under the
seller-optimal auction algorithm, sellers receive a payoff of 1, while buyers receive a payoff of 0.
The payoffs identified in Section III of the main document are then the convex combinations of
these points, generating payoffs of 1− β for sellers and β for buyers.

Now that Lemma OA-1 has been proved, it remains to be shown that the Corominas-Bosch
decomposition does not affect the payoffs identified in Section III of the main document.
Corominas-Bosch decomposes her network through an algorithm that deletes links to generate
subnetworks. The algorithm deletes links connecting buyers and sellers such that for each link
deleted, either the buyer is left in an LS network (hence the buyer extracts all the surplus
anyway) or the seller is left in an LB network (hence the seller extracts all the surplus anyway).
Consider deleting a link lij that leaves buyer i in an L
S network. In the LS network, i extracts
all the surplus, and so the deleted link did not affect the price received by this buyer. Further,
j would not have wanted to trade over this link either, as i would have extracted the entire
surplus and trade over lij cannot have left j with a positive payoff. Thus deleting the link does
not affect the trade partner or payoff of the buyer or seller. An equivalent argument can be
made about deletion of links to a seller that would leave the seller in an LB network. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition OA-2.
Proof. It is useful to first introduce the concept of an improving path. An improving path is
a sequence of networks where each element of the sequence represents a profitable deviation
made from the previous network by an agent:
Definition: An improving path from a network L1 to a network LK is a finite sequence of
networks (L1, . . . ,LK) such that for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K−1} at least one of the following conditions
holds, and for LK none of them hold:
(i) There exists li′j′ such that Lk+1 = Lk ∪ {li′j′} and ui′(Lk+1) − γc ≥ ui′(Lk) and
vj′(Lk+1)− (1− γ)c ≥ vj′(Lk).
(ii) There exists an agent i′ and a set of links Lˆi′ connected to i′ such that Lk+1 = Lk \ Lˆi′
and ui′(Lk+1) + |Lˆi′ |γc ≥ ui′(Lk), where |Lˆi′ | is the cardinality of Lˆi′ .
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(iii) There exists an agent j′ and a set of links Lˆj′ connected to agent j′ such that Lk+1 =
Lk \ Lˆj′ and vj′(Lk+1) + |Lˆj′ |(1− γ)c ≥ vj′(Lk), where |Lˆj′ | is the cardinality of Lˆi′ .
The existence of a pairwise Nash stable network can be shown by finding an improving path
(which will terminate by definition) from some initialization of the network. This is because
when an improving path terminates, there are no profitable deviations to prevent this network
from being pairwise Nash stable.
As γ ∈ (0, 1), each formed link must benefit both the buyer and the seller. Initialize the network
as follows:
(1) Find the efficient network.
(2) Remove any links that are not pairwise stable.
This network exists, because there is always an efficient network (and this network is generically
unique). From this initialization, it will be shown that an improving path exists. Thus a stable
network will be found.
First, it will be shown that none of the links present in this initialized network can ever be
deleted and that no new links are formed for the purpose of trade. Second, it will be shown
that there exists an improving path where no trade links are ever deleted.
All links in the initialized network are used for trade. Consider round k of an improvement
path. Suppose that the same links are traded over as in the initialization. There cannot exist
a next step in an improvement path where a link is formed with an unconnected agent. Such a
link would not benefit the unconnected agent (and would therefore not be formed) unless it were
used for trade. If it could be used for trade, it would have been formed in the initialized network.
Consider now two agents who already trade, but not with each other. They cannot form a link
between them that will be used for trade, because such a link would have been formed in the
initialized network. The only possible links that can be formed are outside option links that
connect two agents that currently trade.
For a trade link to be deleted, it must be the case that one of the agents it connects does
not benefit from it. This can occur only if the outside option of that agent’s trade partner is
sufficiently high. Suppose that this did occur, and that the agent deleting the link is i′. It must
then be the case that γc > ai′µ∗(i′) − vµ∗(i′). Thus, γc > ai′µ∗(i′) −
∑
l∈Lµ∗(i′)s→b
al +
∑
l∈Lµ∗(i′)b→s
al.
However, the current trade links are all in the efficient network. Thus ai′µ∗(i′) +
∑
l∈Lµ∗(i′)b→s
al −∑
l∈Lµ∗(i′)s→b
al > c; otherwise, the network with trade over the outside option links would have
been more efficient (had higher net gains from trade). This is a contradiction, and so none of
the trade links formed in the initialization can ever be deleted.
As no new trade links are formed in an improving path, no outside option links can become
trade links without deleting an existing trade link. Thus as existing trade links are not deleted,
the set of links traded over remains constant. It therefore follows that along any improving
path, only outside option links are formed or deleted.
Each outside option link that is formed must increase the outside options of the two agents it
links, and it must also weakly increase the outside options of all other agents in the network.
Furthermore the positive uni-directional complementarity between outside option links means
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that a formed outside option link will be deleted only when a more profitable outside option link
becomes available and replaces it. This can happen only if other outside option links formed
in the interim period make the new outside option link better than the old one. The links
formed in this interim period could also have been formed prior to the first outside option link.
This is because outside option chains never cycle, and so the first outside option link cannot be
incentivizing the formation of these links. Thus there must always exist an improvement path
where no outside option links are deleted and in each step of the improving path an outside
option link is added.4

A.3. Proof of Corollary OA-1.
Proof. By construction of the improving path in the proof of Proposition OA-2, there exists
a stable network where all traded-over links are also traded over in the efficient network. To
move from this stable network to the efficient network, the following two steps can be taken:
First, links that are used for the purpose of trade in the efficient network but that are not in
the stable network are added. This removes all underinvestment inefficiency. Second, links not
traded over can be removed eliminating all overinvestment inefficiency and yielding the efficient
network. Thus there is no coordination inefficiency. 
A.4. Proof of Proposition OA-3.
Proof. The proof is by counterexample. Consider the potential gains from trade shown in Figure
OA-7 for β = 78 and c = 6.
8
s1
b1 b2
8
Figure OA-7. Potential gains from trade
There are four networks that could be formed: ∅, {l1,1}, {l2,1}, and {l1,1, l2,1}. It will be shown
that there is a profitable deviation leading away from each of these possible networks, hence
none of them is pairwise Nash stable with transfers.
The payoffs of each agent in these possible networks are given in Table 1. As cost sharing is
determined endogenously, there is often a range of possible cost shares. To capture this, the
4 The number of outside option links in the network can be thought of as the output of a function that is
increasing along every step of the improvement path. Jackson and Watts (2001) shows that the existence
of such a function can be used to establish existence of a stable network.
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cost shares are stated explicitly, although these are not predetermined. Buyer b1’s cost share
of link l1,1 is given by γ1, and b2’s cost share of link l2,1 is given by γ2.
Possible Networks
∅ {l1,1} {l2,1} {l1,1, l2,1}
u1 0 7− γ16 0 −γ16
u2 0 0 7− γ26 −γ26
v1 0 1− (1− γ1)6 1− (1− γ2)6 8− (2− γ1 − γ2)6
u1 + v1 0 2 1− (1− γ2)6 2− (1− γ2)6
u2 + v1 0 1− (1− γ1)6 2 2− (1− γ1)6
u1 + u2 + v1 0 2 2 −4
Table 1. Payoffs from possible networks
Consider first the empty network. From Table 1 forming link l1,1 is jointly profitable for b1 and
s1, and so moving to this network is a profitable deviation from the empty network. Consider
the network {l1,1}. Regardless of how the cost of forming link l1,1 is split (i.e., regardless of
γ1), forming link l2,1 is jointly profitable for b2 and s1 (there exists a γ2 such that both b2
and s1’s profits weakly increase and one of their profits strictly increases).
5 Thus there is a
profitable deviation away from {l1,1}. By an equivalent argument, the network {l2,1} is not
stable. Finally, the network {l1,1, l2,1} results in a negative joint payoff, and so at least one
agent must receive a negative payoff regardless of γ1 and γ2. This agent will find it profitable
to delete all their links, and so there is also a profitable deviation away from this network.
As there exists a profitable deviation leading away from each of the possible networks, regardless
of the cost shares reached in these networks, there is no network that is pairwise Nash stable
with transfers. 
A.5. Proof of Proposition OA-4.
Proof. Exogenous costs
It is convenient to first prove the following lemma:
Lemma OA-2.
(i) When cost sharing is exogenous and γ ∈ (0, 1) the efficient network will be pairwise
Nash stable if and only if for all links lij such that j 6= µ∗(i;α(Le)), (1 − β)(aij −
aµ∗(j)j) ≤ γc or β(aij − aiµ∗(i)) ≤ (1 − γ)c, and for all links liµ∗(i;α(Le)), βaiµ∗(i) ≥ γc
and (1− β)aiµ∗(i) ≥ (1− γ)c.
(i) If only buyers can pay towards the cost of link formation (γ = 1), the efficient network
will be pairwise stable if and only if for all efficiently matched buyers (that is, for all i
such that µ∗(i;α(Le)) 6= i), βaiµ∗(i;α(Le)) ≥ c and maxj{aij − aµ∗(j;α(Le))j} ≤ c1−β .
5 Seller s1 will necessarily pay the entire cost of forming the link (γ2 = 0) because b2 does not benefit
from it.
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Proof. To simplify notation, for this proof we use µ∗(.) for µ∗(.;α(Le)).
Part (i): It has already been shown that in the efficient network there are never sufficient
incentives for additional links to be formed for the purpose of trade. See the proof of Proposition
OA-2.
The efficient network is then stable as long as there are no incentives to form outside option
links or to delete trade links. For a trade link to avoid being deleted, both the buyer and seller
must benefit from it. As there are no outside options in the efficient network, a buyer i′’s benefit
from a trade link is βai′,µ∗(i′), while a seller j
′’s benefit is (1− β)aµ∗(j′)j′ .
To avoid the formation of outside option links, the following must hold: For every potential
outside option link, either the buyer or seller must receive benefits lower than their costs of
forming it. As the formed outside option chain would involve only one outside option link, a
buyer i′ will benefit from an outside option link to j′ by an amount (1−β)(ai′,j′ −aµ∗(j′)j′) (see
Theorem 1 in Section III of the main document). Similarly, a seller j′ will benefit from this
outside option link by an amount β(ai′,j′ − ai′,µ∗(i′)).
Part (ii): By the proof of Proposition OA-2, no buyer will ever want to form a trade link.
The benefit to a buyer i′ of trading over a link in the efficient network is βai′,µ∗(i′). Thus for a
buyer to maintain this traded-over link, it must be the case that βai′,µ∗(i′) ≥ c.
Unmatched buyers can never benefit from an outside option link. Matched buyers will not
form an outside option link li′,j′ (where j
′ 6= µ∗(i′)) if and only if the costs of doing so are
greater than the benefits: c ≥ (1 − β)(ai′,j′ − aµ∗(j′)j′). These conditions can be consolidated
by considering whether a buyer i′ would form a link to any seller. Buyer i′ will not want to
form a link to any seller if and only if c ≥ (1− β)(maxj′ 6=µ∗(i′){ai′,j′ − aµ∗(j′)j′}). 
Consider a buyer i and seller µ∗(i;α(Le)) such that aiµ∗(i;α(Le)) > c. From Lemma OA-
2, when γ ∈ (0, 1) there will be underinvestment if and only if either βaiµ∗(i;α(Le)) < γc
or (1 − β)aiµ∗(i;α(Le)) < (1 − γ)c. Equivalently there will be underinvestment if and only if
min{βγ , (1−β)(1−γ)} < caiµ∗(i;α(Le)) . As liµ∗(i;α(Le)) was formed in the efficient network, aiµ∗(i;α(Le)) ≥ c.
Part (i): When β = γ, the above condition becomes min{βγ , (1−β)(1−γ)} = 1 ≥ caiµ∗(i;α(Le)) and there
is no under-investment.
Part (ii): When γ = β = 1 or γ = β = 0, the condition in part (ii)b of Lemma OA-2 is
met and there is no overinvestment (as well as no underinvestment by Part (i)) in any stable
network. There is thus no profitable deviation away from the efficient network.
Part (iii): When γ ∈ (0, 1), each component of each stable network is arranged into a chain.
Outside option links must benefit both the connected buyer and seller for them to both invest
in it, each agent can benefit from at most one outside option, and, from Lemma 1 outside
option chains never cycle. In any network other than the empty network, there must then exist
a buyer and a seller each of whom has a trade link but no outside option link. However, if
β = 0, then this buyer will not be willing to invest in his trade link; and if β = 1, this seller
will not invest in his trade link. Thus the unique stable network will be the empty network.
Endogenous costs
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It is helpful to first prove the following lemma:
Lemma OA-3. When cost sharing is endogenous, the efficient network will be pairwise Nash
stable with transfers if and only if for all i, j such that j 6= µ∗(i;α(Le)), the following holds:
1
(
aij > aµ∗(j;α(Le))j
)
(1− β)(aij − aµ∗(j;α(Le))j)
+1
(
aij > aiµ∗(i;α(Le))
)
β(aij − aiµ∗(i;α(Le))) ≤ c,
where 1 is an indicator function taking value 1 if the condition to the right of it holds and 0
otherwise.
Proof. By the proof of Proposition OA-2, there are no incentives to form links for the purpose
of trade. None of the links already formed will be deleted either. This is because the benefit
the connected buyer and seller jointly receive from the link is given by aij , and as this link
was formed in the efficient network, aij ≥ c. The only remaining deviation to consider is the
addition of links to the efficient network for the purpose of forming an outside option.
Consider first the incentives of seller j to form an outside option link. For link lij to provide j
with an outside option in Le ∪{lij}, i must want to trade with j rather than µ∗(i;α(Le)) when
all sellers receive a price of zero: aij − aiµ∗(i;α(Le)) > 0. Furthermore, if lij is added to Le, i will
bid up j’s price, when buyers have all the bargaining power, by (aij−aiµ∗(i;α(Le))). Seller j will
therefore be willing to pay up to β(aij − aiµ∗(i;α(Le))) to form the link. An equivalent argument
for buyer i shows that they will value the link only when aij > aµ∗(j;α(Le)),j and will be willing
to pay up to (1 − β)(aij > aµ∗(j;α(Le)),j) to form it. The link lij can never reduce buyer i or
seller j’s payoff and will be formed if and only if
1(aij > aµ∗(j;α(Le))j)
[
(1− β)(aij − aµ∗(j;α(Le))j)
]
+1(aij > aiµ∗(i;α(Le)))
[
β(aij − aiµ∗(i;α(Le)))
]
> c.

Part (i): If all agents’ most preferred trade partners, were they to extract all the gains from
any trade, are different, then all agents can be matched, so that aiµ(i) = maxj aij and aµ(j)i =
maxi aij . Thus aiµ(i) ≥ aij for all j 6= µ(i) and aµ(j)j ≥ aij for all i 6= µ(j). For this match, all
the indicator functions in Lemma OA-3 will be 0 and so the efficient network will be stable.
Part (ii): From Lemma OA-3, as c→ 0 the efficient network will be stable only if aiµ∗(iα(Le)) >
aij for all j 6= µ∗(i;α(Le)) and aµ∗(j;α(Le))j > aij , for all i 6= µ∗(j;α(Le)). If any of these
conditions did not hold, then at least one agent would form an outside option link. Necessary
conditions for this are that argmaxj(aij) 6= argmaxj(ai′,j) for all i 6= i′ and argmaxi(aij) 6=
argmaxi(aij′) for all j 6= j′.
Part (iii): Consider a network Le that is efficient for all c ∈ [c, c]. Two cases are trivial: If Le
is not stable for any c ∈ [c, c], set c∗ < c. If Le is stable for all c ∈ [c, c], set c∗ > c. In all other
cases, there exists a c′ ∈ [c, c] for which Le is unstable and a c′′ ∈ [c, c] for which Le is stable.
At c′ there must exist an outside option link lij , j 6= µ∗(i;α(Le)), that it is jointly profitable
for i and j to form in the efficient network:
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1(aij > aµ∗(j;α(Le))j)
[
(1− β)(aij − aµ∗(j;α(Le))j)
]
+1(aij > aiµ∗(i;α(Le)))
[
β(aij − aiµ∗(i;α(Le)))
] ≥ c′.
Reducing c′ can only increase the incentives to form this link. Thus Le will be unstable for all
c ∈ [c, c′].
At c′′ no outside option links are profitably formed: For any potential link between a buyer i
and seller j 6= µ∗(i;α(Le)), the following condition must hold:
1(aij > aµ∗(j;α(Le))j)
[
(1− β)(aij − aµ∗(j;α(Le))j)
]
+1(aij > aiµ∗(i;α(Le)))
[
β(aij − aiµ∗(i;α(Le)))
] ≤ c′′. (1)
Increasing c′′ can then only further reduce the incentives to form each such potential outside
option link, and Le will continue to be stable for all c ∈ [c′′, c].
There thus exists a c∗ such that c ≤ c′ ≤ c∗ ≤ c′′ ≤ c and the efficient network Le is stable if
and only if c ≥ c∗.
Part (iv):
Consider the network shown in Figure OA-8a, where β = 12 . For c = 1 − 2ε, ε small and
positive, the efficient network is shown in Figure OA-8b. In this network, there are no outside
option links that it would be profitable to form, so the efficient network is stable. Suppose now
that c increased to c = 1− ε2 . The efficient network is now the network shown in Figure OA-8c.
In this network, there are incentives for buyer b1 and seller s2 to form an outside option link,
hence the efficient network is not stable.
s1
b2b1
s2
3 2.5 1-ε
(a) Potential links
s1
b2b1
s2
3 1-ε
(b) Le(c = 1− 2ε)
s1
b2b1
s2
3
(c) Le(c = 1− ε2 )
Figure OA-8. Different efficient networks for different levels of c

A.6. Proof of Proposition OA-5.
Proof.
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NGT (Le)−NGT (L) =
 m∑
i=1
ui(L
e) +
n∑
j=1
vj(L
e)−K ′c
−
 m∑
i=1
ui(L) +
n∑
j=1
vj(L)−Kc
 ,
where K ′ ≤ K links are formed in the efficient network. Now consider a buyer i and seller
j that would trade with each other in the efficient network. If i and j are not connected in
the stable network, then there must not be sufficient incentives for them to form the link lij :
ui(L)+vj(L) ≥ aij−c. If i and j are connected in the stable network, then ui(L)+vj(L) ≥ aij .
As i and j would trade in the efficient network, ui(L
e) + vj(L
e) = aij . Also, regardless of
whether i and j are connected, ui(L) + vj(L) ≥ ui(Le) + vj(Le) − c. Furthermore, in the
stable network, buyer i and seller j must receive payoffs ui(L) ≥ 0 and vj(L) ≥ 0, respectively.
Summing these inequalities across all buyers and all sellers:
m∑
i=1
ui(L) +
n∑
j=1
vj(L) ≥
m∑
i=1
ui(L
e) +
n∑
j=1
vj(L
e)− cK ′
 m∑
i=1
ui(L
e) +
n∑
j=1
vj(L
e)−K ′c
 ≤
 m∑
i=1
ui(L) +
n∑
j=1
vj(L)−Kc
+Kc
NGT (Le)−NGT (L) ≤ Kc

A.7. Proof of proposition OA-6.
Proof. Part (i): In the bargaining outcomes considered, buyers and sellers are matched to
maximize the possible gains from trade. Suppose that µ(b1) 6= s1. Matching b1 to s1 and
µ(s1) to µ(b1) will increase the gains from trade: ab1s1 + aµ(s1)µ(b1) > ab1µ(b1) + aµ(s1)s1 by the
increasing differences condition. Consider now matches such that µ(bk) = sk for all k < K,
but µ(bK) 6= sK . Matching bK to sK and µ(sK) to µ(bK) will increase the gains from trade:
abKsK + aµ(sK)µ(bK) > abKµ(bK) + aµ(sK)sK by the increasing difference condition. By induction,
for any match where ∃k ≤ min(m,n), µ(bk) 6= sk, the surplus can be increased by rematching.
Thus bk will be matched to sk, for all k ≤ min(m,n).
Part (ii): Agents’ outside trade partners are found by removing their trade partner from the
network and considering the optimal rematching. Suppose that µ(bk) is removed from the
network. Sellers ranked below µ(bk) now move up in the rankings. Part (i) can then be applied
to determine the new matches. Thus bk will be matched to the seller ranked in the kth position
in the new network, which will be the seller ranked in the k+1 position in the original network:
η(bk) = sk+1.
Part (iii): Suppose that µ(sk) is removed from the network. Buyers ranked below µ(sk) now
move up in the rankings. Part (i) can then be applied to determine the new matches. Thus sk
will be matched to the buyer ranked in the kth position in the new network, which will be the
buyer ranked in the k + 1 position in the original network: η(sk) = bk+1.
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Part (iv): Not that all agents’ outside trade partners have been identified, Theorem 1 from
Section III of the main document can be applied to determine agents’ outside trade values. It
follows immediately that ubk = ubk+1 + (abksk+1 − abk+1sk+1). Thus ubk > ubk+1 .
Part (v): Applying Theorem 1 from Section III of the main document, it follows immediately
that vsk = vsk+1 + (abk+1sk − abk+1sk+1). Thus vsk > vsk+1 .

A.8. Proof of Proposition OA-7.
Proof. Part (i): When β ∈ (0, 1) and cost shares are exogenous, the only outside option
links that can be formed are those that benefit both connected agents. Under the increasing
difference condition, the efficient network is such that for all potential outside option links
{lij 6∈ Le where aij > c}, either i > j or j > i. For those with i > j, aij − aiµ∗(i;α(Le)) < 0, so j
does not benefit from the outside option link lij . For those with j > i, aij − aµ∗(j;α(Le))j < 0,
so i doesn’t benefit from the outside option link lij . Thus there are no potential outside option
links that benefit both connecting agents, and so no outside option links will ever be formed.
The efficient network will therefore be stable as long as there are sufficient incentives for all
trade links present to be formed: min{βaiµ∗(i;α(Le))− γc, (1− β)aiµ∗(i;α(Le))− (1− γ)c} > 0 for
all i such that aiµ∗(i;α(Le)) > c. Increasing differences implies that aKµ∗(K;α(Le)) ≤ aiµ∗(i;α(Le))
for all i such that aiµ∗(i;α(Le)) > c, and so the efficient network will be stable if and only if
min{β/γ, (1− β)(1− γ)}abK′sK′ ≥ c.
Part (ii): Suppose the efficient network is formed and buyer k is matched to seller k. Buyer
k’s highest possible payoff from forming an outside option link is from forming a link to seller
k + 1. This would generate an outside option for buyer k of ak,k+1 − ak+1,k+1 which, by
the increasing differences condition, is weakly greater than akj − ajj for all j. Further, as
a12−a22 ≥ akk+1−ak+1k+1 for all k, and each outside option link can benefit only the buyer or
the seller, if the highest quality buyer does not want to form an outside option link to the second
highest quality seller, no buyer wants to form any outside option link. By equivalent reasoning,
if the highest quality seller does not want to form an outside option link to the second highest
quality buyer no seller wants to form any outside option link. Thus the efficient network will
be formed if
max{(1− β)(a12 − a22), β(a21 − a11)} ≤ c

A.9. Proof of Proposition OA-8.
Proof. It will be shown that at both extreme points of the core, buyers’ payoffs are greater in
L than in L \ {j′}, while sellers’ payoffs are greater in L \ {j′} than in L.
First, consider the initial payoffs in L if sellers receive their outside option. These payoffs could
have been found by running the multi-unit auction mechanism analyzed by De´mange, Gale,
and Sotomayor (1986) (with sellers’ prices initialized at 0). In this mechanism, the price of
sellers with whom trade is overdemanded is bid up. Suppose now that j′ is removed from the
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network. Any price vector at which trade with a seller was previously overdemanded, at any
point in the multi-unit auction mechanism, would still result in trade with that seller being
overdemanded. Thus the same prices can be reached at an interim stage of this mechanism.
Continuing the multi-unit auction mechanism, sellers prices can only be bid up further.
To find buyers’ outside options, the multi-unit auction mechanism could be used with the role
of buyers and sellers reversed: Sellers bid down their prices, competing for buyers whom many
of them would like to supply at the current prices. Suppose now a seller j′ is removed from the
network. At current prices, trade with no buyer would be overdemanded and so buyers’ outside
options must be weakly lower. Furthermore, if the multi-unit auction were run again, the
removal of j′ may result in trade with a buyer not being overdemanded when it was previously,
and ultimately the price paid by the buyer not being bid down as far.
It has been shown that in network L \ {j′}, sellers’ (j 6= j′) outside options and their seller-
optimal core payoffs are both higher than in L. It therefore follows that for a given β, sellers’
payoffs are higher in L\{j′} than in L. Conversely in L\{j′} buyers’ outside options and their
buyer-optimal core payoffs are both lower than in L, so that for a given β, buyers’ payoffs are
higher in L than in L \ {j′}. 
